

ISRAEL AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BOMB

APPENDIX 1

MEMORANDUM OF **MARCH 1975**

**DECLASSIFIED**

APR 11 1975  
APF VAN DER MERWE  
83411265E LT COL

March 1975

MEMORANDUM

From: CS To: C SADD

THE JERICO WEAPON SYSTEM

1. In considering the merits of a weapon system such as that offered, certain assumptions have been made:

a. That the missiles will be armed with nuclear warheads manufactured in the USA or acquired elsewhere.

b. That the missiles have an acceptable rack life so that they will remain stable and operational while in storage for a considerable number of years.

The need for a nuclear deterrent

2. In a recent study made by the Director of Strategic Studies, the conclusion was reached that a direct and very real threat against the RSA has developed to the point of being a real danger. This fact demands a reappraisal of our strategic policy and the threat must be seen as a real one in the relatively short term. This conclusion is based on the following factors:

a. Although the open use of nuclear weapons against the RSA by those powers which possess such weapons and the potential to deliver them can be discarded for the foreseeable future, we must accept that there is a danger that an enemy, assuming an African identity such as terrorist organisations or a DAD "liberation army" could acquire and launch against us a tactical nuclear weapon. China appears to be the most likely nuclear power to associate herself with such an adventure.

b. The Director of the United States Arms Control Agency maintains that nuclear weapons will become available to sub-national groups such as terrorist organisations within the next ten years.

c. Western anti-communism is no longer a significant force in global tensions.

**DECLASSIFIED**

TOP SECRET

"Acquired elsewhere." Else-  
where = Israel

SA justifies nuke acquis-  
ition by invoking African  
"terrorist groups," in collusion  
w/ China